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(...) Many people in Europe have been surprised at the determination and resolve displayed
by the citizens of the Arab world. There is a great deal of sympathy everywhere for what is
clearly a new beginning. The things which have happened in the past few months highlight
the fact that in recent years Europe in many respects has spent far too much time thinking
about itself. That is the reason why it has sometimes tended to forget about its neighbours.
But suddenly all that has changed as a result of the pro-democracy unrest in Tunisia and
Egypt. People in Europe are very anxious and full of sympathy, and are now keeping an eye
on the situation as it develops. (...) In Germany and Europe we know from experience that
such processes and changes are frequently protracted and often rather wearisome. But we
are firmly convinced that a common path leading to democracy and participation is the only
feasible one, and the only one which holds out the promise of success. Self-confident and
determined citizens are the most important constituent elements of a vibrant society and
economy. Only a dynamic community can innovate and create much-needed transformation
processes from within. True, an open debate and opposing forces are not always easy to
manage. But they ensure that no important aspects are omitted, and ideally they will team
up to forge a sustainable solution. (...) We believe that sustainability has its origins in socie-
ty. It must give every citizen the opportunity to participate and to develop his or her talents.
Cohesion and identification can materialize only if people have the feeling that there is jus-
tice, and that their contribution is worth the effort. Moreover, they wish to be seen and to be
taken seriously as people with opinions of their own. 
Such aspirations to sustainable societal development are ambitious, and they will not emerge
entirely on their own. One will have to keep plugging away at the fundamentals and basic
conditions in order to give people the opportunity to make the most of their abilities. The
results of our research suggest that five key factors are involved:
- Children and young people need across-the-board access to qualified education. The lack
of a well-trained labour force places severe restrictions on the development of society and
the economy.
- The integration of all societal groups is a prerequisite for a successful new beginning and
the ongoing reform process. Ethnic, religious and political barriers must be overcome just
as much as gender boundaries in order to give all citizens a perspective for social ad-
vancement and prosperity.
- Secure employment which can enable people to pay for their daily needs forms the basis of
participation. It creates room for manoeuvre for personal development and societal activities.
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- The demographic structure has a formative influence on the character and the perspec-
tives of any given society. The rising average age in the EU is leading to changes in the
demands being made on the welfare systems. In North Africa with its youthful population
there is growing pressure on the labour market.
- And, last but not least, citizen participation forms an integral part of sustainable social
development. Free opinion formation and decision-making are the only ways in which it
will be possible to arrive at sound and reliable conclusions and decisions in the future.
Of course the basic conditions, the challenges and the demands are very different at various
places around the world. Yet in the long run each country will have to take note of the fact
that its citizens want to participate in its economic success and the political decision-making
process.
In this regard Morocco has a marvellous opportunity to pursue a path of its own. The salient
political parameters are certainly in much better shape than in many other countries in
North Africa. Moreover, there is a great willingness on all sides to embrace change, and the
door to dialogue remains wide open. King Mohammed VI has responded to the protests and
debates in Moroccan society and called for a comprehensive reform process. For our hosts
this opens up the prospect of moving towards a peaceful, free and modern Morocco. Such a
joint development process would send out a powerful message to the region as a whole and
to the people who live in it.
(...) The search for low-risk and environmentally friendly forms of energy generation will be a
key question for the EU in the years and decades that lie ahead. The great energy needs of the
north and the hitherto largely untapped sources of solar energy in the south may well turn out
to be a stable basis for joint economic development. In addition to the fact that we are neigh-
bours, and in addition to the values and ideas which we share, this would lead to a stable axis
capable of promoting joint sustainable development. Such cooperation between Europe and the
countries of North Africa would not be aimed at the short-term exploitation of finite resources,
but at enduring economic cooperation between north and south. The societies and industries
in Europe are looking for a very high level of energy security coupled with a low level of envi-
ronmental degradation (. . .) For the Mediterranean region this may well constitute the basis
for the establishment of future-oriented economic structures of its own.
In the years ahead our host, Morocco, could well become a trailblazer for peaceful political
reform processes in the region, and the bridgehead for a new energy partnership between
Europe and North Africa. I would be extremely gratified if we could now manage to provide
some kind of impetus for a sustainable process of this kind with the help of the Kronberg Talks. 
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After decades of authoritarian rule increasingly self-confident citizens in North Africa and
the Middle East are asking to be given political, social and economic participation rights, 
responsible governance and the rule of law.
This civil society revolt against established government structures has differed significant-
ly from country to country. New political systems are in the making in Tunisia and Egypt.
Far-reaching political reforms have been announced in Morocco, Jordan and Oman. In Libya,
Syria, Bahrain and Yemen the rulers have resorted to the use of force in an attempt to sup-
press the protests.
The European Union and its citizens and member states should lend their support to popu-
lar demands for political and economic participation and justice which are being voiced in
their southern neighbourhood. This is not only a moral obligation. It is also in Europe’s best
interests. Detailed country-specific strategies are now required.
The EU must make it clear to governments which have elected to use repression that their
blatant disregard of the political will of the people will have consequences and that their
leaders will no longer be seen as legitimate political partners of the EU. The EU should
attempt to enlist the support of the international community for its views. At the same time
this standpoint should not prevent the Europeans from providing for the humanitarian
needs of refugees and victims of armed conflict.
However, in keeping with the notion of positive conditionality and its “more for more” prin-
ciple, Europe should concentrate on cooperating primarily with the new democracies in
Tunisia and Egypt and the governments which have not only announced meaningful
reforms, but are actually implementing them.
The societies concerned will have to bear the brunt of the political transformation processes
themselves, and each country will choose its own particular path. Against this background,
European assistance should be construed as something that will help the EU’s southern
neighbours to help themselves.
Tunisia and Egypt need robust support in order to consolidate their new political systems,
institutions, political parties and other organisations. Furthermore, they need economic
assistance, for the uprisings have disrupted important segments of their economies such as
the tourism sector.
The EU should encourage governments which are willing to introduce reforms, and lend sup-
port to their attempts to translate their promises into concrete political changes that are in
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line with what people actually want. In particular there is a need for a more effective sepa-
ration of powers, intensive efforts to counter corruption and greater respect for civil rights
and the freedom of the press. The time of cosmetic reforms is gone for good.
The demands being made by the protest movements transcend purely political matters and
include economic and social issues. The lack of employment opportunities and the absence
of an economic perspective are a major source of potential conflict and pose a serious risk
to all of the countries in North Africa. In order to meet this challenge Europe and North
Africa should define a vision of sustainable development which will make it possible to pur-
sue common interests and to develop the region’s existing potential. Projects that can help
to create permanent employment opportunities in the region and improve its ability to gen-
erate wealth are of particular importance in this context.
Thus the EU would have an immediate impact if it granted the countries in North Africa
unrestricted access for their agricultural products to the internal European market. The
adoption of better agricultural methods and a more effective use of water and arable land are
other areas in which cooperation could flourish. Moreover, the Europeans should also pro-
mote the process of diversification in the North African economies by helping to develop a
local capital goods industry.
Enhancing mobility should be another element in the cooperation. The introduction of joint-
ly managed circular migration programmes for students, businessmen and skilled workers
would be a particularly promising endeavour. Such migration schemes would also be one
way of dealing with the demographic challenges to the north and to the south of the
Mediterranean, and could build bridges between societies and cultures. Furthermore, they
could have a long-term effect on the labour markets in North Africa, especially if the
migrants, when they return to their countries of origin, are encouraged to develop their busi-
ness ideas and thus to create employment opportunities and prosperity.
The area of renewable energy sources would seem to offer an especially attractive perspec-
tive. The Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Desertec private sector project are blueprints for
cooperation in the generation of power from alternative sources. Projects such as these have
the potential to help people in Europe and North Africa to improve their long-term energy
security. And they could help to create urgently needed employment opportunities in North
Africa and to strengthen regional cooperation.
The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East have taken the European Union and its
member states completely by surprise. What started in Tunisia with protests following on the
self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor in the small town of Sidi Bouzid, has
led to demonstrations across the region that have demanded political, social and economic
reforms.
This paper focuses on North Africa, and looks at the events that have been shaking the poli-
tical landscape of the region ever since. On the basis of an assessment of the underlying 
causes of the uprisings and of the political reaction to what has been happening in the
region and in Europe, it suggests ways in which Euro-Mediterranean relations might be re-
vised, and makes proposals for a new approach to this partnership.
During the last decade Euro-Mediterranean relations have been characterized by a process
of increasing depoliticization on the one hand and securitization on the other. Political re-
form and human rights issues have been sidelined, while matters such as combating terror-
ism and containing migration have taken over the agenda. The final step in this process was
the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), a fragile edifice dominated by govern-
ments, which assigned only a marginal role to civil society. As a result of the war in Gaza
and the worsening Arab-Israeli conflict even this endeavour came to a grinding halt and the
support it had received from Mediterranean states (not to mention northern and central
European countries) declined.
The uprisings across the region brought into play a new force that had previously been sup-
pressed, marginalized or ignored: the people. Contrary to the expectations of many obser-
vers, it was not the religious groups which took to the streets. A broad coalition from differ-
ent parts of society challenged the prevailing political systems and socio-economic orders.
The ability of the political elites in the region to react to these protests differed significant-
ly from case to case. The autocratic regimes in particular proved unable to respond positive-
ly to the demands, and thus had to rely on their security apparatus to stay in power. In other
countries the political leaders were more flexible and promised to introduce far-reaching
reforms. This raised hopes of a genuine transformation of the political systems which would
lead to greater participation and representation.
Hence, while there are clearly similarities between the demands being made in countries
across the region, what has actually taken place on the ground has been rather different. In
Tunisia and Egypt the regimes were ousted after they had lost the backing of the armed forces,
which sided with the demonstrators. In Libya sections of the armed forces have joined the
rebels, while other sections have stayed loyal to the regime. This has led to armed conflict.
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In order to de-escalate the internecine strife, the UN has given a mandate for international
military intervention. Despite the ongoing and peaceful demonstrations, the regimes in Yemen
and Syria have paid only lip service to the demands for reform and change and reacted with
repression. In Bahrain GCC armed forces have intervened in order to help the King to quell
the demonstrations. In Morocco, Jordan and Oman, on the other hand, the rulers have pro-
mised political reforms in order to accede to popular demands.
Observers from within and from outside the region have outdone each other in inventing a
host of new expressions to describe what has been going on. They range from the rather ne-
gative word ‘wildfire’ to ‘Arab Spring’, ‘falling dominoes’, ‘Arabellion’ or simply ‘1-11’. What-
ever term one decides to use, there is general agreement about the epoch-making nature of
the events unfolding in the Middle East. 
Establishing a new political system or reforming a malfunctioning one is not an easy task.
Moreover, socio-economic problems such as the high unemployment rates, a lack of rural
development, and the deficits in the education sector will not disappear as a result of the
introduction of political reforms. They pose formidable challenges for all of the countries in
the region. Other transformation states have demonstrated that there is a risk of failing to
meet the expectations of the protesters. 
There is also a danger that the old guard is stronger than expected. Moreover, one should not
forget that in the 1960s the military coups in many Arab countries were initially greeted
with much enthusiasm, though they soon relapsed into political stagnation and autocratic
styles of government.
For these reasons the task of translating the political achievements of the protest movement
into a new political order is a daunting challenge. Arab societies will have to bear most of
the burden themselves, though the international community in general and the EU and its
member states in particular can lend their support to these efforts by helping to consolidate
the political transformation processes and contribute to the improvement of the socio-econo-
mic conditions in North Africa and the Middle East. For the EU this means that once again
it will have to refocus and overhaul its policy towards the region.
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In the early stages of the revolutions in particular the Europeans were in obvious disarray.
In order not to threaten their close political and economic ties with the North African auto-
cracies in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, some European member states were very reluc-
tant to lend political support to the mass protests. In general, they were more concerned
about the role that Islamic movements might play, and about the large waves of refugees and
asylum seekers that were to be expected as a result of the conflicts and reduced border con-
trols. In the case of Tunisia this even led to the infamous offer from the then French minis-
ter of foreign affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie, to support Tunisian dictator Zine el Abidine Ben
Ali by helping his police to deal with the protesters. With regard to Egypt, the Europeans
were initially concerned about the geopolitical implications of a new regime in Cairo, and
especially its relationship with Israel and its ability to balance Iran’s regional ambitions.
When the uprising in Libya started, they were much more forthcoming in rhetorical terms.
Thus they unanimously called for the resignation of Muammar Gaddafi. However, when it
came to meeting the demands of the Libyan opposition, which wanted a no-fly zone over
Libya in order to protect itself from attacks by Gaddafi’s air force, many Europeans hesitated.
It once again became apparent that there is no such thing as a coordinated and coherent
European reaction to an evolving crisis, even if it is in the immediate neighbourhood.
This low-key approach was also mirrored in the academic, media and public discourse about
the events in North Africa. It was widely believed that Arab countries were unlikely to intro-
duce reforms because they were in the firm grip of their political leaders, and on account of
the apparent lethargy of the population. For this reason no one expected these revolutionary
movements to emerge or to succeed before they actually appeared.
However, when it comes to the Europeans, the uprisings and revolutions also cast doubt on
their long-term approach to the Arab Mediterranean countries. It became apparent that
European policymakers had confused stagnation and the status quo with stability, and for
this reason had preferred to cooperate with autocratic regimes instead of supporting those
who wanted reforms and change. Stefan Füle, the Commissioner for Enlargement and
European Neighbourhood Policy, summed this up in a self-critical manner: "We must show
humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local
democratic forces in the region. (...) Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authori-
tarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region (...)"
Such preferences were also in stark contrast to the normative goals stipulated in the
Barcelona Declaration, the founding document of the Barcelona Process. This was launched
in 1995 in order to establish the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The initiative was
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buoyed up by the hopes generated by the Oslo Process and the belief that the end of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was imminent on the one hand, and the economic and political
transformation the EU had witnessed in its eastern neighbourhood on the other. Yet the EMP
did not achieve very much when it came to supporting and initiating political transforma-
tion processes in the southern Mediterranean states. The assumption that after the end of
the East-West conflict the spread of democracy and liberalism was unstoppable, and that the
“end of history” was also going to be reached in North Africa and the Middle East proved to
be an error. Whilst the regimes in the region accepted economic liberalization and export
orientation as a recipe for growth, they proved to be largely impervious to the kind of demo-
cratization processes that had occurred in many East European, African, and Latin American
countries as part of the so-called “third wave of democratization.” 
With the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which it adopted in 2003-2004, the EU tried
to realign its policies in order to create a “ring of friends” consisting of “well-governed states”
on its eastern and southern borders. As a result of the detailed Association Agreements and
Action Plans that have been negotiated with the countries in question, the ENP has provided
the EU with a much more specific and flexible instrument with which it can support reforms
that its partners are trying to introduce. In its initial form the ENP contained a clear-cut
(though flexible) normative component.
However, in the first decade of the 21st century the importance of democracy and human
rights declined as far as the Europeans were concerned, and the EU did not use the ENP in
the way it had originally intended. After 11 September 2001, and especially after the ter-
rorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, cooperation in the fight against terrorism moved
to the top of the agenda. It is true that democratization was considered to be a possible ele-
ment in a long-term strategy designed to combat terrorism, but the fear that Islamist parties
could come to power in North Africa and the Middle East soon dominated European thinking
to the exclusion of all else. Strong showings by Islamist parties in elections in Egypt and
Lebanon heightened such anxieties. The international refusal to recognize the Hamas-led
government that emerged from the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections eventually led
to a situation where the Western rhetoric about democratization lost all credibility. Since
then the region’s despots have adroitly portrayed themselves as the sole alternative to
Islamization. 
As a result of the rising number of migrants and refugees trying to reach Europe via the
Mediterranean, the question of how one deals with migration has been put on the joint co-
operation agenda. The EU’s “Global Approach to Migration” is a multitrack and, at least in
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theory, balanced strategy for resolving and regulating the problem of migration. However,
with regard to the states of North Africa, it is primarily concerned with stopping refugees,
border security, and returning illegal immigrants to their countries of origin. The issue of
how some North African regimes have treated refugees and illegal immigrants has not been
very high on the EU’s agenda. 
Furthermore, the regional frameworks for democratization and political reform deteriorated
as a result of the failure of the Oslo process, the advent of the second Intifada, and the wars
in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. 
Over the course of the past decade and against a background of counter-terrorism, migration
limitation and regional crises and wars there has been a noticeable trend towards securitiza-
tion in relations between northern and southern Mediterranean states. This has led to greater
centralization and government dominance when it comes to setting the agenda and exclu-
ding questions of political reform.
Thus the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, which reinforced
both the predominant position of governments in general and the marginalization of civil
society, is in line with the uncritical political character which Euro-Mediterranean relations
have acquired over the years.
The UfM was established as an intergovernmental organisation headed by a co-presidency
consisting of one northern and one southern member state – and given guidance at (bi)an-
nual summits by the heads of state  and government  and foreign ministers – in order to en-
sure that both sides developed an equal sense of ownership with regard to the institution
and its projects. The UfM Secretariat – which began to operate rather belatedly in March
2010 without having achieved anything since – was supposed to foster the institutional
structure and increase its ability to take action. This, in turn, was intended to upgrade and
revive Trans-Mediterranean relations. 
The high hopes associated with the UfM were dashed a long time before the start of the tur-
moil in the Arab world. However, as a result of the changes taking place in the region its
attractiveness has been reduced even further. 
Against this background, there is a need for a revision of the EU’s policy towards North
Africa, and various proposals and concept papers have been submitted by a number of poli-
tical groups on the national and European levels.
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Of the numerous ideas that are currently doing the rounds, the Joint Communication
“Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” drafted
by the European Commission and Baroness Ashton, the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is probably the most elaborate proposal. It offers sup-
port for political transformation, including the establishment of democratic institutions; pro-
mises a greater degree of decentralization so as to include civil society; and sets its econo-
mic sights on sustainable growth and development. Moreover, taking into account the diver-
sity of what is happening in the countries of the region, it emphasizes the principles of dif-
ferentiation, bilateralism and positive conditionality (‘more for more’) and turns the inter-
governmentalization and depoliticization of the EMP on its head.
This shows that the EU is on the right track as it updates its strategies, policies and instru-
ments. However, it is worth restating the key principles that need to be borne in mind in
order to strike a healthy and indeed honest balance between the political pretensions of the
Euro-Mediterranean relationship and the realistic possibilities of such a partnership.
Focus on bilateralism and positive conditionality. The Commission’s proposal for a new
Partnership describes in some detail the importance of bilateralism and differentiation for
the EU’s policy towards the region. Moreover, it envisages a stronger focus on positive con-
ditionality and stipulates the idea of ‘more for more.’ Europeans should adhere to these prin-
ciples in order to focus on those partners who are willing and able to proceed with reforms. Yet
they will have to reach agreement with their partners on benchmarks on how to measure the
progress of political reforms in order to be able to apply the concept of positive conditionality.
Develop policies specific to subregions. Multilateralism and regional cooperation (and
integration) should be applied in a more selective way with regard to participating actors
and subject areas. The Western Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean
are geographical subregions with specific characteristics and problems. For this reason the
EU ought to acknowledge the fact that in North Africa there are unique opportunities and
challenges. Geographical differentiation will make it possible to address subregional issues
and to promote cooperation among its Mediterranean partners.
React consistently to human rights violations. Positive conditionality and the ‘more for
more’ principle indicate that the EU is trying to focus on specific issues and to reward those
who introduce reforms. However, the EU will also have to find ways of dealing with actors
who reject the need for reform, ride roughshod over human rights, and use violence to sup-
press dissent. Europeans need to reach agreement about the political and economic sanc-
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tions they are willing to impose, and about when they are willing to use armed force. None
of these options are easy ones, and they are all rather risky. Libya is a case in point. 
Expand the concept of joint ownership. Joint ownership has rightly become a key princi-
ple in the EU external cooperation programmes that form part of the ENP or the UfM.
Participation in the planning and decision-making process increases the legitimacy of these
programmes and ensures that they actually meet the needs and priorities of the various
partners. However, the implementation of this principle should assign a reduced role to
governments and give civil society and the private sector a say in the consultative process.
This would be a good idea not only in a normative sense, but also because it would be a prac-
tical way of procuring added value, since sub-state actors will be providing the expertise and
innovation skills needed to cope with the challenges of increasingly complex societies. 
Accept the fact that religious movements have a place in the region’s political culture.
In the past the EU clearly had certain preferences when it came to cooperation in the region.
As a result of political, economic and cultural affinities, and haunted by the spectre of poli-
tical Islam, Europeans favoured liberal and secular movements and took little or no notice of
whether they were representative of society as a whole. This practice has been referred to
as ‘picking winners,’ and it ignored important developments in the Arab world. Europeans
will have to accept the fact that people in the Middle East are going to make their own poli-
tical choices, and that Islam is part of the region’s political culture.
Do not make promises that you cannot keep. Whenever a political upheaval such as the
one we are witnessing in North Africa today occurs, there is a danger that well-meaning
spectators will get carried away by the euphoric atmosphere and raise expectations that they
are later unable or perhaps unwilling to fulfil. This in turn may create a sense of relative
deprivation and disappointment in the countries concerned which will not only negatively
impact Europe’s reputation, but may also undermine the political changes themselves. The
fact that European policy towards the region has a history of not delivering on promises
should encourage decision-makers not to repeat the mistakes of the past.
Ensure that cooperation programmes benefit society as a whole. Even though the EU’s
external cooperation programmes have emphasized this principle for a long time, the regional
elites have often benefited most, and trickle-down effects have been negligible. Large-scale
infrastructure projects with a long-term impact are no doubt important, but the EU should
focus on projects that have a direct effect on people’s lives, e.g. tariff- and quota-free access
to the European market for agricultural products, liberalized migration schemes, and coopera-
tion in the areas of education, vocational training and rural development.
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Focus on projects that create added value for both sides. The sustainability of coopera-
tion depends on the generation of added value for the participants.  In the past, political
actors tended to select cooperation projects on the basis of their strategic needs. The basic
idea of the UfM, which considers itself to be a Union of projects, tried to change this, but due
to its institutional and political weakness it never actually made much headway. Nonetheless,
this idea should be pursued in the future. In order to expand the basis of the partnership and
to increase the added value, it would be a good idea to promote greater involvement by the
private sector. This seems advisable in view of the huge investments that are needed for the
modernization of Middle East economies and for the creation of jobs in the region.
Provide adequate financial resources. Approximately € 12 billion in funding have been
earmarked for the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for 2007-2013. As
a result of current developments, the Commission and the European Parliament have pro-
posed ways of providing additional resources for the southern states. Even though the chal-
lenges facing the EU and its partners in North Africa are not simply a financial issue, Euro-
peans must ask themselves if this level of funding adequately reflects the strategic impor-
tance of its southern neighbourhood. A substantial increase in the resources available within
the new Financial Framework of the ENP seems to be a foregone conclusion.
Emphasize intra-European commitment and coordination. Some EU member states have
traditional links with the region and are pursuing their own agendas, while other member
states have refrained from developing a regional policy at all. They tend to be rather luke-
warm about European initiatives. Europeans will have to accept the fact that they have res-
ponsibilities in their immediate neighbourhood, and that this is not the time to pursue self-
ish interests in the region. Euro-Mediterranean relations need to be revitalized, and this
calls for commitment and a cooperative spirit from all EU member states. 
Avoid overburdening regional civil society actors. The nascent democracies in Tunisia
and Egypt have received a great deal of international attention, and there is a real risk that
local parties and NGOs will be swamped with external actors offering to provide assistance,
projects and ideas. In order not to overburden them, the EU should establish a forum for
ideas in which European and other NGOs and funding institutions can coordinate their acti-
vities before getting in touch with partners in the region.
Coordinate activities with other external actors. In order to create synergies or at least
to avoid unnecessary disagreements, the EU should engage in a dialogue with other actors
such as the US, Turkey and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). With its
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strategic influence and military might, the US continues to play a crucial role in the region.
Turkey has a growing regional reputation and is often regarded as a transformation role
model by Arab societies. Whether or not this is actually justified is a matter for debate. And,
last but not least, the GCC countries have become important economic actors in the
Mediterranean. Cooperation and coordination with the US, Turkey and the GCC is also indis-
pensable with regard to the following point.
Seek a more active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the political debates in Israel there
have been persistent demands that the window of opportunity created by the changes in the
Arab world should be used to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU should support
such views and an internationally coordinated policy of engagement towards the Israeli
government that takes into account Israel’s security concerns and at the same time en-
courages it to make use of this historic opportunity. The Middle East Quartet should be the
forum for this initiative. In this context Europeans should also note that there is a risk that
the conflict will worsen. As a result of demographic developments and the support being
given to the settlements, a two-state solution is becoming increasingly unlikely. The window
of opportunity may well disappear when the Palestinians, as envisaged, ask the UN Security
Council to give its blessing to their statehood in September 2011. 
The time has not yet come to write off the UfM. The numerous deficits and shortcomings
of the UfM have been discussed in some detail in the political and academic debates on the
subject. Under these circumstances it seems even less likely that the UfM will be in a posi-
tion to do what it set out to do, and its future looks more uncertain than ever. Despite all the
disappointments, it is in the interests of neither the Europeans nor the member states to
write off the UfM as a bad job. Some of the UfM projects, e.g. cooperation in the development
of renewable energy, marine de-pollution, support for small and medium enterprises, and
city partnerships make sense for all the parties concerned and should not be abandoned
simply because the UfM has been a political failure. Moreover, the appointment of Youssef
Amrani as new UfM Secretary General has filled the leadership gap. In the medium term a
multilateral forum that assembles the heads of state and government may turn out to be a
worthwhile institution where issues of common concern can be discussed. However, in order
to avoid giving this forum more than it can chew, the principle of subregional differentia-
tion, which was alluded to above, should also be applied to the UfM.
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A major challenge, and one that is going to have to be tackled in the near future, is the ques-
tion of providing support for the nascent democratic institutions in Tunisia and Egypt and
assistance for the transformation processes in other countries of the region. Political parties,
trade unions, organisations of various kinds, special interest groups, independent media and
journalists are indispensable actors in a democratic system. It is especially important to
ensure that the social interest groups, which took part in the demonstrations, are now ade-
quately represented and integrated into the new political party system. In Tunisia, for instance,
the number of registered parties has increased from thirteen in January 2011 to over fifty
only four months later.
In Tunisia, Egypt, and in other countries, constitutional reforms are either in progress or
have already been decided on. New electoral and party laws are being drafted, and the
reform of the judicial and security sectors, the abolition of emergency powers, the reinforce-
ment of the rule of law and civil liberties are on the political agenda. In all this it is essential
to ensure that the different sections of society are appropriately represented. Moreover, in
Tunisia and Egypt various elections have been scheduled for 2011. Organising and preparing for
these elections and monitoring the way in which they are implemented will be another mile-
stone in the consolidation of the new political systems. The fact that the elections are going
to be held in the very near future constitutes a challenge to the new parties in particular.
They will have to finalize their election manifestos and establish procedures designed to
ensure intra-party democracy and to enable them to run their election campaigns.
Europeans have a great deal of experience in this area, and the Commission and the member
states can offer to help their partners in the region and to underpin the reform process by pro-
viding training schemes, technical support and funding if this is requested from the region. 
Furthermore, Europeans should also offer to help their partners to reform the security and
judicial sectors. Security forces have been involved in human rights violations across the
region and political change will mean calling into question some of the established organi-
sational practices. Also corruption has become an almost omnipresent feature of many
North African states. Fighting corruption and establishing a reliable and transparent judi-
cial system would contribute a great deal to an environment that is more conducive to
human development and economic growth. 
Coordination and a conscious attempt to avoid overburdening regional partners are of major
importance in the context of cooperation with political groups and NGOs. The nascent demo-
cracies in Tunisia and Egypt in particular have received a great deal of international atten-
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tion. Although direct links and cooperation between European political parties, trade unions
and organisations and their counterparts in the region are no doubt beneficial, there is a real
risk that partners in North Africa will be swamped with external actors offering to provide
assistance, projects and ideas. In order not to overburden them, the EU should establish a
forum for ideas in which European and other NGOs and funding institutions can coordinate
their activities before getting in touch with partners in the region. 
Europeans should also step up support for civil society institutions and the networks that
were established as part of the Barcelona Process, e.g. the Euro-Mediterranean Studies Com-
mission (EuroMeSCo) and the Anna Lindh Foundation. They have notable partners in the
region and a reputation for political independence. It may well be a good idea to add new
institutions such as the Civil Society Forum, which has received support from HR Baroness
Ashton, since it would institutionalize the role of civil society in multilateral political proces-
ses that go beyond the bilateral structure of the ENP.
Moreover, the EU should maintain close ties with civil society representatives when it plans
ENP projects, and make the inclusion and empowerment of civil society an important feature
of ENP implementation.
In this context the EU will also have to reconsider its attitude towards civil society groups
and political parties that have a religious background. Muslim groups of this kind have
underpinned important political and economic transformation processes in North Africa in
the recent past and often adopt a progressive political stance that is combined with a tradi-
tional cultural position. This attracts a great deal of popular support. The EU has repeatedly
stated that it intends to do more to engage these groups. Not a great deal has happened in
this area, partly because the EU, in the context of the struggle against terrorism, has tended
to see political Islam as a security problem and not as a political movement. This is proble-
matical for the EU from a normative perspective, and because it is at variance with the Euro-
pean position that stakeholders should all participate in the political process. Furthermore,
such a position implicitly re-introduces the notion of a “clash of civilizations” into European
policymaking, and this is neither to the point nor helpful.
Apart from the obvious political effect, which is to assist the protagonists of the transforma-
tion process, the idea of encouraging and supporting interaction between European and
Mediterranean civil societies will also help to decentralize Euro-Mediterranean relations. By
underpinning relations with a social network, it may be possible to create a sustainable part-
nership capable of withstanding turmoil on the intergovernmental level. In addition to the
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institutions mentioned above, a particular focus should be on the educational sector.
Cooperation on the research and tertiary education level already exists. It should be intro-
duced on other levels, and in areas such as primary and secondary education, and educa-
tional sector governance. School partnerships, exchange programmes for both teaching and
administrative staff and pupils would not only help to improve the educational systems in
North Africa, but also support the creation of social networks. 
Strong civil societies are not only of importance as actors in the transition to democracy.
When they have to cope with globalization and modernization, societies must be willing to
adapt in order to seize opportunities and deal with risk. This cannot be done as part of a top-
down process, and needs to be understood as a task for society as a whole. For this reason
‘agents of change’ such as entrepreneurs, civil society, political, religious and other social
groups should be encouraged to develop their ideas and to make a contribution to innova-
tion and social development. When all is said and done, giving people a say in determining
the future of their country is what the protests were all about. 
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In addition to the political demands that have been voiced by the demonstrators, some of the
major concerns which have prompted people to take to the streets are economic grievances
and marginalization. The high level of unemployment among young people in the countries
of the region and the unequal distribution of wealth that has been generated as a result of
high economic growth rates have led to dissatisfaction with the various political systems.
However, the protests and the ensuing reforms have created expectations in terms of econo-
mic participation and social justice that will be difficult to fulfil. The European Commission
estimates that in the North African countries the number of new jobs that will have to be
created in order to meet the demand for employment is a third or even two-thirds higher
than in the last five years. The economic situation remains a potential source of political
instability and social unrest.
Since it is an economic heavyweight in the immediate vicinity, the EU is in a position to
make a substantial contribution to sustainable economic development in the area. Notwith-
standing the immediate economic assistance which has been granted to support the conso-
lidation of the new and reformed political systems, this is not about transferring money from
the EU to North Africa. It is about acting together, trying to identify common interests, and
seizing the opportunities that present themselves. Moreover, Europeans should support and
encourage regional cooperation in North Africa, and help a region that is rich in natural and
human resources to develop its specific potential. For this reason European cooperation pro-
grammes should be revised to incorporate sub-regional differentiation. They should attempt
to include the private sector, and they should be based on the principles of interdependence
and civic empowerment.
20
The Arab World in Transition
Socio-economic problems
Sustainable economic
development
Developing a Shared Vision of Civic Empowerment and
Sustainable Co-development for North Africa and Europe
Civic Empowerment and Sustainable Co-development
Demographic developments in the majority of European countries will lead to growing
labour shortages and skills gaps in the coming decades. This may well pose a threat to wel-
fare and pension systems in many EU countries in the medium term. In contrast to this,
many Mediterranean countries currently have high unemployment rates, especially among
youth. During the global recession and the slow economic recovery, many highly skilled
workers could not find jobs that were commensurate with their skills and qualifications. The
pressure on the region’s labour markets has eased in some countries since, but unemploy-
ment rates among well-educated and young people remain high. Youth unemployment was
a major contributing factor to protests in several Arab countries, and it is a key political issue
throughout Europe and North Africa. 
It may well be possible to enhance the positive impact of migration (triple win) in the light
of the different demographic challenges that North Africa and Europe face in the medium
term. More mutually beneficial mobility schemes designed to facilitate temporary legal
migration, such as EU mobility partnerships and bilateral temporary worker programmes,
could help to reduce illegal migration in low–skill sectors and help highly skilled migrants
to obtain employment commensurate with their qualifications. Such schemes would take
into consideration the labour market needs of European countries and could include multi-
ple entry visas that would promote circular migration and reduce the risk of a brain drain.
The European Commission has made some progress with regard to including flexible forms
of mobility into recent directives and proposals, e.g. the “Blue Card” initiative for highly skil-
led migrants, as well as arrangements for seasonal workers and inter-company transfers.
The debate about a revision of the ENP once again highlights the potential of migration.
However, the member states must agree to these directives and incorporate them into
national law.
The EU and a number of European states have concluded bilateral agreements that promote
circular migration, e.g. seasonal worker programmes, the EU’s mobility partnerships, and
student visa programmes. Sweden in particular has developed a number of policies ranging
from labour migration to pension and citizenship that seek to promote circular migration
and development. Highly skilled workers who are willing to leave their countries of origin
in order to obtain well-paid employment abroad would find the EU a more attractive destina-
tion if their visas allowed them to live and work in more than one EU member state. It is
especially important to have a transparent legal framework for labour migration. The possi-
bility of acquiring citizenship and a positive attitude to immigration are also key factors.
Furthermore, the portability of social benefits (including pensions) is a significant issue
when it comes to facilitating mobility. Development policies should be coordinated with
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migration and reintegration policies in the countries of origin, especially those that help
returnees to build on their skills and international networks in order to start a business.
They would then be generating employment opportunities and making a contribution to eco-
nomic growth and prosperity. A legal environment which facilitates the activities of small
and medium  enterprises is almost or just as important as the provision of financial assis-
tance in this context.
Emerging common European frameworks on migration and asylum policies need to be devel-
oped in order to improve the overall transparency of visa requirements and work regulations
for non-EU nationals in the EU. They should also simplify the bureaucratic hurdles involved
in applying for a visa or a work permit. Fostering mobility and enhancing circular migration
should become a focus of EU migration and development policies, since these can help all
the parties involved, including the migrants themselves, to benefit from migration.
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In many North African countries agriculture is a sector that is of great importance for the
economy and the labour market. On account of their competitive advantages in this labour-
intensive segment, and as a result of support and encouragement from both the interna-
tional financial institutions and the EU, these states have tried to generate export-driven eco-
nomic growth by focusing on agricultural products and foodstuffs. This strategy has been no
more than a partial success, since the main potential recipient of agricultural products, the
European Union, has failed to open its market, in clear contravention of earlier promises and
undertakings. Thus as far as the EU is concerned a very obvious step would be to enhance
market access for agricultural products from North African countries. This would be tanta-
mount to giving them a major economic boost. 
At the same time the issue of agriculture and trade needs to be put in the broader perspective
of food security. There are some products where North African countries are important pro-
ducers and exporters, but in terms of their total food production and consumption, many of
them are net importers of food. They depend in particular on the import of grain. This on the
one hand has something to do with the natural conditions in the region, e.g. the lack of arable
land and water. On the other hand it is the result of growing urbanization, rural poverty and
underdevelopment, and changes in the kind of crops that are cultivated, e.g. because the focus
is now on exports. Moreover, the changes in crop cultivation have increased the need for irri-
gation systems, which simply exacerbates the existing water scarcity in the region. Climate
change, rising temperatures and droughts are expected to aggravate this problem.
Thus North African countries have come face to face with the problem of striking a balance
between the need to ensure their food security, economic interests related to the export of
agricultural products, and the dictates of environmental sustainability.
In order to deal with this dilemma there is a need for action in a number of different areas.
On the one hand, political changes are necessary to foster agrarian reform and rural devel-
opment. On the other hand, it is imperative to improve agricultural productivity. This per-
tains in particular to the efficient use of water and arable land. For instance, regional govern-
ments ought to develop a pricing mechanism that takes into account the cost of water. The
EU member states and EU development cooperation agencies could offer to help their south-
ern neighbours to develop rural areas and to employ more sophisticated irrigation systems
that reduce water wastage. 
Agricultural exports do not have to come to a grinding halt on account of environmental sus-
tainability and food supply security. And such factors should not stop the EU from opening
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its markets. However, the challenges should be borne in mind in the agricultural production
process, and taken into account when one defines legal frameworks and economic develop-
ment strategies. For instance, an assessment of the impact of trade in agricultural products
should include the net balance of the “virtual water” that is part of such exports and imports,
i.e. the water that has been used in the production process. 
Since issues such as food supply security and water scarcity are challenges that apply to the
whole region, it would appear that regional cooperation in these areas would make eminent
sense. In order to identify best practices and other issues down the road, research projects
on climate change, resource scarcity, and the counter-measures to be adopted should be ini-
tiated and carried out by researchers and institutions from Europe and North Africa. The
management of water reserves and natural resources, food production, civil protection and
the socio-economic impact, e.g. migration induced by climate change, are some of the issues
of common concern. Moreover, supporting the states in question to enable them to develop
national strategies to counter the effects and mitigate the short, medium, and long-term con-
sequences of climate change should be a substantial element in these activities. The urgen-
cy of the matter has been underlined by the findings of various multinational studies, espe-
cially the reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which
considers the Mediterranean and North Africa to be a region that is very vulnerable to the
impact of climate change.
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The need to reconcile energy security with the dictates of environmental sustainability is
another key challenge that North Africa and Europe have in common. In addition to the eco-
logical issues involved, reliable access to affordable energy supplies is a major social factor
and a prerequisite for economic growth and development. 
Demographic and economic changes point to the fact that energy dependence in Europe and
in the Mediterranean area will become more acute in the years ahead. There is only a finite
amount of fossil fuel and its use exacerbates the effects of climate change. Moreover, there
will probably be greater competition for hydrocarbons, and prices will no doubt rise. Last but
not least, the high risks associated with nuclear power suggest that this technology is not an
acceptable alternative when it comes to resolving the conflicting claims of energy security
and climate change.
Energy issues have for a long time been an important element in Euro-Mediterranean rela-
tions, and electricity generation from renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and environ-
mental security should be the centrepiece of cooperation within the Mediterranean area and
in North Africa. The technology for generating electricity from wind and solar power systems
is readily available. The natural conditions for such renewable energy installations are ideal.
Moreover, since the energy sector is the place where private, economic and political interests
meet, it is generally considered to be a very promising and dynamic area.
The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP), the Desertec Industrial Initiative and the Transgreen
project are three initiatives that have received a lot of attention in this context. MSP is an
intergovernmental project that was launched within the UfM framework, though as a result
of the paralysis that beset the UfM after the Gaza War, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya,
Egypt, Jordan and the EU continued to work on it without reference to the UfM. MSP aims
to develop a “sustainable energy future in the Mediterranean region”. To this end it is try-
ing to “increase the use of solar energy and other renewable energy sources for power gener-
ation, improve energy efficiency and savings, and develop electricity grid interconnections.”
The MSP participants want to install a 20-gigawatt (GW) renewable energy capacity on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean by 2020, of which 5 GW is going to be exported to
Europe. 
The Desertec Industrial Initiative was founded by a group of companies under the leadership
of German reinsurance giant Munich Re. It has forecast an estimated investment of € 400
billion and intends to build thirty Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) plants in the Sahara by
2050. Like MSP, Desertec expects to establish a 20 GW renewable energy capacity (with the
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emphasis on solar energy) and to export some of it to Europe by 2020. By the year 2050
Desertec wants to be able to supply 15 percent of the EU’s energy needs. The Transgreen
project, which is headed by French energy giant EDF, is hoping to establish a consortium
consisting of power companies, network operators and manufacturers of high-tension equip-
ment. Transgreen aims to set up a Trans-Mediterranean supergrid consisting of high-voltage
direct current cables and capable of exporting 5 GW to Europe by 2020, i.e. the same amount
of energy MSP is hoping to export. There is considerable potential for cooperation between
Desertec and Transgreen, since the former is focusing on power plant infrastructure in
North Africa, whereas the latter is concentrating on energy transmission systems. 
These projects have a lot to offer for all concerned. There is a rapidly growing demand for
energy in North Africa, and the cost of energy is also rising in the European economies.
Morocco and Tunisia are dependent on energy imports, and thus have a strategic interest in
alternative sources of energy. Libya and Algeria can channel their large oil and gas reserves
into the export market if they are able to fall back on alternative sources of energy. In North
Africa, cooperation with regard to renewable energy sources promises an influx of foreign
investment, technology and skills, new and upmarket employment opportunities, and the
revenues accruing from energy exports to Europe. Moreover, reliable supplies of energy are
also an important factor in the strategies which are trying to diversify the regional econo-
mies and attract new industries. As far as the Europeans are concerned, MSP, Desertec and
Transgreen will help them to diversify their energy sources, to fulfil their ambitious ecolo-
gical goals, to reduce CO2 emissions, and to save increasingly scarce resources.
In addition to these economic and environmental aspects, a regional project that creates bene-
fits for all the participants will also set a positive example for regional cooperation. This is
something that is urgently needed in order to improve the political atmosphere in North Africa.
The technical feasibility of the projects is not in fact the biggest problem that will have to be
dealt with when one thinks of the looming political and economic challenges.
The shift from fossil fuel to renewable energy requires considerable financial resources and
contains an element of economic risk. If the private sector is going to make the necessary
investments, there will have to be a clear political framework  which will ensure that the
right kind of grid is in place, that its investments are safe, and that the regulatory part of
the equation is transparent and reliable. Since renewable energy, even under favourable cir-
cumstances such as those that exist in North Africa, is not financially viable in the short run,
there needs to be a political environment capable of ensuring that this kind of investment
can be based on long-term economic planning. In Europe in particular this will require the
political will  to provide the necessary financial support through feed-in remuneration for
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green energy or ‘take-or-pay’ contracts of the kind which are often concluded in the natural
gas sector. This is a steep political hurdle, and striking an appropriate balance with regard
to financial risks and burden-sharing between public and private interests constitutes a con-
siderable challenge. 
Hence, political backing is absolutely essential. Experience has shown in Europe and other
parts of the world that sustained support of this kind is needed if renewable technologies are
to become a major source of energy supplies.
However, in Europe structural conservatism and influential interest groups have held up the
introduction and dissemination of new technologies, have supported high barriers to entry,
and have made it rather difficult to formulate a common energy policy on the EU level.
Moreover, there are doubts about whether or not projects such as Desertec can actually be
implemented. Concern has been voiced that the immense infrastructural changes in North
Africa and Europe may turn out to be impracticable in political and economic terms. 
In the Maghreb area the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, the West Sahara conflict and
other political difficulties have prevented the emergence of the kind of greater regional co-
operation that would facilitate the implementation of Desertec, Transgreen and MSP as
regional projects. Moreover, with the exception of Morocco, there are not many lobbyists who
can mobilize political support for these projects.
And, last but not least, in North Africa there is certain mistrust of these initiatives, which
are perceived to be of European origin, and there are doubts about the extent to which they
can create real added value for states in the area. In other words, will these projects actually
create badly needed jobs and help to reduce the pressure on the local labour markets and
make a contribution to economic development? Moreover, there is scepticism about the
extent to which locally generated energy will be made available to local consumers at an
affordable price. Conversely, some Europeans are uneasy about what they believe is energy
dependence on an unstable region.
Desertec, Transgreen and MSP are carefully crafted projects that actually fit together rather
well, which is why they should receive the appropriate kind of support. All three initiatives
are planning to install a regulatory and legal framework and an institutional and economic
environment that will allow investors to calculate the long-term cost of developing and con-
structing the requisite infrastructure.
Furthermore, a number of general and certain specific measures can be adopted to support
these projects and to create a more favourable political atmosphere. 
27
Prospects and Challenges for a Revitalized Relationship between Europe and North Africa
Political challenges
Mutual mistrust
A few successful and high-profile pilot projects will go a long way to enhancing the popular-
ity of the initiatives, and to make people throughout the region more willing to cooperate.
Such projects should also be used to dispel anxieties that the initiatives are primarily for the
benefit of the Europeans. On the one hand including a number of local companies can allay
fears of this kind, and on the other hand it would be a good idea to tone down the subject of
electricity exports to Europe and to concentrate instead on greenhouse gas emission per-
mits. With regard to reducing CO2 emissions, local consumption of green energy would have
a greater impact than if it were exported to Europe.
Hitherto the main research and development activities have been in the hands of European
companies. However, states in North Africa would no doubt think that it was a good idea if
cooperation with MSP, Desertec and Transgreen were to include joint research and develop-
ment programmes, vocational training, and the provision of traineeships for employees from
the energy sector. This would ensure that the transfer of knowledge and technology forms
an integral part of cooperation in the energy sector. A project such as the ‘Desertec
University Network’ could be taken as an example of how this might be done. Such research
projects could also deal with two issues that have been alluded to above: the management of
natural resources, and finding ways of mitigating the consequences of climate change.
Topics such as desalination and energy efficiency are certainly worth bearing in mind. 
Yet it is even more important to ensure that energy cooperation is accompanied by the crea-
tion of permanent employment opportunities for skilled workers in the region who can con-
tribute to the generation of wealth and economic growth. This does not have to be confined
to the energy sector. Once the power plant infrastructure is in place, North Africa might well
become an attractive location for energy intensive industries, and this would have a positive
effect on the employment situation. Moreover, locally generated energy and waste heat re-
covery systems could also be used for desalination plants, and this would help the region to
deal with the problem of water shortages. 
In Europe Desertec has been welcomed as a very dynamic and possibly faster way of achiev-
ing results than MSP with its rather political background. However, some criticism has been
levelled at Desertec because it is a project dominated by large companies. Similar concerns
have been voiced about Transgreen. Thus it is essential to make sure that small and medium
enterprises (SME) also have a part to play in these projects. It would emphasize the element
of sustainability and make it easier for Europeans to contribute to the requisite financial
framework with loans and feed-in remuneration for renewable energy that is generated out-
side (though consumed within) Europe.
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Against the background of the political changes that have swept across North Africa and the
Middle East, there have also been demonstrations in Morocco. A protest movement called
“February 20 Movement for Change” has emerged. In response to popular demands and in
keeping with Morocco’s tradition of political reforms, King Mohammed VI announced a major
constitutional overhaul. In his statement the monarch outlined a series of specific initiatives,
e.g. recognizing that the Berbers are an integral part of the Moroccan identity, which will be
enshrined in the constitution. The King also announced the introduction of the concept of
“Advanced Regionalization,” which seeks to strengthen the powers of the regions by grant-
ing them greater autonomy from the central government. The judiciary is to be given the sta-
tus of a separate branch, which will improve the system of checks and balances and
strengthen accountability and the rule of law. The reform of the power structure will also
affect the Moroccan parliament, the members of which will be chosen in free elections and
given greater powers. With this, Morocco intends to move towards the constitutionalization
of civil liberties and citizens’ rights.
A commission chaired by Abdelatif Menouni, which includes eighteen public figures such as
lawyers, political activists, technocrats and representatives of ethnic minorities and human
rights groups, has been given the task of sifting through the ideas and demands emanating
from various different social stakeholders, e.g. political parties, trade unions and associa-
tions, and youth organisations and intellectuals. The hearings will provide the raw material
which the commission will use in order to formulate a series of recommendations relating
to constitutional reform that will be the subject of a referendum. 
Morocco has always been perceived as a model of modernity and openness in the Arab
world. Yet in recent years the country has lost ground in international surveys like the Press
Freedom Index, the Corruption Perception Index and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.
With his speech King Mohammed VI confirmed his support for the country’s reformist ambi-
tions and tried to give a boost to the series of social and economic reforms that have been
implemented during his reign. The king’s pronouncements also set Morocco apart from
many other countries in the region, where the leading politicians have been far less respon-
sive to popular demands and have reacted either by making lukewarm promises or adopting
a more repressive approach.
There is general agreement that the reforms outlined by the king point in the right direc-
tion, and observers in Morocco and elsewhere have welcomed the initiative. Other observers
have concentrated on the tasks that still have to be dealt with, in particular fighting corrup-
tion, implementing socio-economic reforms, and insisting on the freedom of the press. Thus
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the King’s speech and the start of the consultation process are important milestones, but a
great deal of work still remains to be done. 
The current hearings of the consultative commission have included various sections of civil
society such as youth movements, political parties and other organisations. This is a ground-
breaking development that has generated a lively public debate for which Morocco deserves
credit. It is to be hoped that the Menouni commission’s conclusions will live up to all these
high expectations. After the referendum on the commission’s proposals, the main challenge
will be to implement the reforms swiftly and in a transparent manner. 
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Maintaining good bilateral relations with the EU is an important strategic goal for Morocco’s
foreign policy. For the EU, on the other hand, Morocco is an important partner in North
Africa. Moroccan foreign policy assigns a privileged position to France in virtually every
area of bilateral cooperation. Morocco’s relations with Spain involve a certain amount of fric-
tion, since it has territorial claims on the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Spanish
North Africa. 
Morocco participates in a number of multilateral forums. They include the UfM, the 5+5
Dialogue, and the “Mediterranean Forum”. However, even more important for Morocco is
bilateral cooperation with the EU within the ENP framework.
The EU’s positive assessment of Morocco was demonstrated by the fact that in October 2008
it became the first Maghreb nation to be granted Statut Avancé status within the ENP. Such
close links with Europe are supposed to ensure the country’s economic and social develop-
ment in the medium term. And the EU has shown its appreciation of Morocco’s consistent-
ly pro-European policies. 
The Advanced Status framework essentially consists of measures designed to intensify poli-
tical and economic relations between Morocco and the EU. 
There is to be a more profound dialogue on the political level. Furthermore, Morocco is going
to be included in the planning process for specific aspects of European policy. Against this
background, the EU-Morocco summit, which was held on 7 March 2010 in Granada, was im-
portant for two reasons. Thus it was the first summit based on Morocco’s Advanced Status,
and, second, it was the first summit with a Mediterranean partner after the Treaty of Lisbon
had come into force.
Morocco’s Advanced Status is designed to improve its access to the single European market.
It will entail a step-by-step adoption of the Acquis Communautaire as it pertains to impor-
tant aspects of economic policy, and of a more comprehensive free trade agreement. In addi-
tion to the liberalization of trade in the agricultural sector that Morocco deems to be espe-
cially important, this agreement makes things easier for the cross-border movement of ser-
vices, capital, and (to a limited extent) people. The agreement is a logical step as far as
Morocco’s economic policy is concerned, since 60% of the country’s foreign trade is with the
EU. However, a further decline in tariffs would place a significant burden on the Moroccan
budget and in the short term might lead to a loss of jobs in the industrial sector. On the other
hand, the agreement makes life easier for investors, since there is now unrestricted access
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to the European market, and greater financial support from the EU will open up numerous
opportunities for the Moroccan economy. In financial terms no other country benefits from
the ENP as much as Morocco. Another important aspect of Morocco’s economic links with
Europe are the remittances from Moroccans who live abroad. 
Moreover, Morocco wants to turn tourism into one of its most important economic sectors,
and for this reason has initiated the Plan Azur. Europeans are the most important target
group. As a result of the air travel agreements with the EU, European airlines (TUI, Easyjet,
Ryanair) now offer more flights to Moroccan destinations.
In North Africa Morocco is the country which has reacted to MSP and Desertec in the most
positive way. Morocco currently has to import 97% of its fossil fuels and 15% of its electrici-
ty. As a result of increased demand, import dependency has in fact increased slightly over
the last couple of years. Coal is still Morocco’s predominant energy source, although plans
for a nuclear facility are also being discussed. However, renewable energy is becoming in-
creasingly important. Wind and solar power could take care of a large part of Morocco’s ener-
gy needs, and might even turn a net importer of power into a net exporter. By 2020 Morocco
wants to obtain 20% of the energy it needs from renewable energy sources.
In 2007 the EU and Morocco signed a Memorandum of Understanding on increased energy
cooperation, and Morocco is a member of an informal MSP working group. Its grid has al-
ready been synchronized with the Central European UCTE network. Furthermore, its ener-
gy market has been liberalized, at least to a certain extent, and its 1997 interconnection with
Spain is currently being upgraded. 
Morocco’s Advanced Status is of importance primarily on account of the political symbolism
involved. The EU and Morocco now have a solid basis for the future, though they must make
every effort to utilize it in political and economic terms.
Thus it should be borne in mind that mobility and easing the visa rules for Moroccans are
important issues as far as Morocco is concerned. The EU should try to deal with them in a
positive way. They should not be used to force Morocco to cooperate on matters such as the
relocation of refugees and the fight against illegal migrants. The concept of circular migra-
tion outlined above can be beneficial for both sides. Moreover, it would also tie in with the
idea of an improved civil society network.
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In the Western Sahara conflict the EU has not adopted a very coherent position in political
terms. On the one hand it has not officially recognized Morocco’s annexation of the territory,
and on the other hand it has given its de facto approval of the annexation, e.g. in the
Morocco-EU fishing agreement.
The EU has always demonstrated its concern about the humanitarian situation. Moreover, on
account of the energy cooperation issue and the envisaged regional projects the Western
Sahara conflict is once again on the agenda. This is particularly true with regard to MSP,
since the Western Sahara is an ideal location for the generation of wind power.
The EU has consistently supported the negotiating process and the attempts by the UN
Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to find a political solution to this regional dispute
that is acceptable to all sides. In various statements it has recognized that in the long term
adherence to the status quo is not an acceptable option, has called on all of the parties to the
conflict to enter into meaningful and intensive negotiations, and has urged them to bear in
mind that realism and the spirit of compromise are essential in order to resolve this issue.
Yet substantial progress towards a resolution of the conflict has not been achieved, and the
2011 Report of the UN Secretary General is rather sceptical. However, there is no alternative
to a negotiated settlement, and the EU should continue to support the work of the UN. 
Furthermore, as an indirect contribution to the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, the
EU should also focus on the relationship between Algeria and Morocco. Rabat and Algiers
are not only at loggerheads about the Western Sahara conflict. There are quite a few other
disputes, and one of these is about the delineation of the border between the two states. The
animosities between Algeria and Morocco have placed constraints on regional cooperation.
They have brought the Arab Maghreb Union to a standstill, and have moulded the way in
which the two states behave towards other countries and international organisations. For
this reason the EU should do what it can to promote bilateral channels of communication
and use institutions such as the UfM and the ENP and the tools at their disposal to bring
about a political and economic rapprochement between the two countries.
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The historic winds of change are sweeping over North Africa. Increasingly self-confident citi-
zens are calling for political and economic reform, good governance, the rule of law, merito-
cracy and social inclusion. The emergence of the people as a decisive factor in the political
systems creates unprecedented opportunities for civic empowerment and social develop-
ment. However, it also poses a challenge to the incumbent regimes, which have reacted to
popular demands in very different ways. 
The European Union and its citizens and member states should not miss this historic oppor-
tunity to welcome and lend their support to popular demands for political and economic par-
ticipation, democracy and justice in their neighbourhood. This is not only a moral obligation.
It is also in Europe’s best interests. However, its response should mirror the diversified na-
ture of the political landscape in North Africa. 
The Europeans must make it clear to the repressive governments in Libya and Syria that
they will have to pay a heavy political and economic price for their blatant disregard of the
will of the people. Such political leaders can no longer be seen as legitimate partners. Whilst
the EU should attempt to gain the support of the international community for its convictions,
it should also continue to do what it can to provide for the humanitarian needs of the local
population, of the refugees and of the victims of these conflicts in general. 
In keeping with its ‘more for more’ principle, Europe should concentrate on providing sup-
port for governments, which are going to introduce meaningful reforms, and for the nascent
democracies. It is clear, of course, that the societies concerned will have to bear the brunt of
the political transformation process themselves, and that every country will choose its own
particular path. For this reason European assistance should be construed as something that
will help the EU’s southern neighbours to help themselves.
Tunisia and Egypt need robust support for their new political systems, democratic institu-
tions, organisations, and political parties. Moreover, they are also in dire need of economic
assistance, for the political unrest has disrupted important segments of the national econo-
mies such as the tourism industry.
The EU should encourage reform-oriented governments and lend support to their attempts to
translate their promises into concrete political changes that are in line with what people actu-
ally want. In particular there is a need for a more effective system of checks and balances,
sustained efforts to counter corruption and greater respect for civil liberties and the freedom
of the press. The time of cosmetic reforms has gone for good and there is now a need for real
and meaningful political change. This will be quite a sea change as far as European policy-
makers are concerned, especially since in the past they tended to focus on stability and main-
34
Conclusions
Conclusions
The Arab World in Transition
A people’s revolt
Moral and political obligation
Dealing with repression
‘More for more’
Egypt and Tunisia
Reform-oriented governments
taining good relations with the regional governments despite their negative human rights
records. Although the EU initially tried to adopt a low-key approach, it has now embarked on
a revision of its earlier policies in order to emphasize concepts such as accountability, the
inclusion of civil society, and positive conditionality. However, Europe’s role should not be res-
tricted to providing support for the transformation of political institutions and political prac-
tices. The demands being made by people in North Africa transcend purely political matters
and include economic and social issues. They are particularly concerned about the lack of
employment opportunities and the absence of an economic perspective. This poses a serious
challenge to all of the countries in North Africa and is a major source of potential conflict. 
In order to meet these challenges Europe and North Africa ought in fact to enunciate a joint
vision for sustainable co-development. And this should not be construed as a European scheme
designed to provide support for the North African economies, but as a programme that can
generate common benefits and help the region to develop its full potential. Projects that can
help to create permanent employment opportunities in the region and to improve local capa-
cities capable of generating wealth are of particular importance in this context. An immedia-
te step should be to grant reformist countries in North Africa better access to the Single
European Market, which would enable them to make full use of their competitive advantages.
This is especially true when it comes to agricultural products. The adoption of better agricul-
tural production methods and a more effective use of water and arable land are areas in which
cooperation could flourish. Moreover, the Europeans should also promote the process of eco-
nomic diversification by helping to develop a local capital goods industry. 
Facilitating mobility between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean should
be another element in the proposed cooperation. The EU’s Mobility Partnerships are very use-
ful tools in this regard. Jointly managed circular migration schemes for students, business-
men and skilled workers would be a promising project in this context. In order to have a posi-
tive effect on the employment situation in North Africa, migrants should be both empowered
and encouraged to develop their business ideas when they return to their countries of origin.
This would also be one way of dealing with the demographic challenges to the north and to
the south of the Mediterranean, and it could forge links between societies and cultures. 
If we take a medium- or long-term perspective, sustainable energy security should also be
on the shared agenda. Despite the economic and political challenges, joint projects such as
the Mediterranean Solar Plan or the Desertec private sector initiative are potentially successful
blueprints for a partnership dedicated to the generation of power from alternative sources.
They can help people in Europe and North Africa to improve their energy security. And they
would go a long way towards creating urgently needed skilled employment opportunities in
North Africa and promoting regional cooperation.
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Zusammenfassung des Strategiepapiers „The Arab World in Transition: Prospects and Challenges for
a Revitalized Relationship between Europe and North Africa” der 13. Kronberger Nahostgespräche.
Nach Jahrzehnten unter autoritärer Herrschaft fordert eine zunehmend selbstbewusste
Bürgerschaft in Nordafrika und dem Nahen Osten politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche
Teilhabe, verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung und Rechtsstaatlichkeit.
Dieses zivilgesellschaftliche Aufbegehren gegen die etablierten Herrschaftsstrukturen hat
in den Ländern der Region sehr unterschiedliche Auswirkungen: In Tunesien und Ägypten
entstehen neue politische Systeme; Marokko, Jordanien und Oman haben umfangreiche poli-
tische Reformen angekündigt; in Syrien, Bahrain und Jemen versuchen die Führer die
Protestbewegung mit militärischen Mitteln zu unterdrücken; besonders prekär ist die Lage
in Libyen, wo seit Wochen ein Bürgerkrieg tobt.
Europa muss die historische Gelegenheit nutzen und die öffentlichen Forderungen nach
politischer und wirtschaftlicher Teilhabe und Gerechtigkeit, die in ihrer südlichen Nachbar-
schaft erhoben werden unterstützen. Dabei handelt es sich nicht nur um eine moralische
Verpflichtung – dies ist auch in Europas bestem Eigeninteresse.
Gegenüber den repressiven Regierungen müssen die Europäer deutlich machen, dass die
Missachtung des politischen Willens der Bevölkerung Konsequenzen hat und dass diese
Führer sich als politische Partner für die Europäer disqualifizieren. Für diese Haltung soll-
te die EU auch bei ihren internationalen Partnern werben. Gleichzeitig darf diese Position
die Europäer aber auch nicht davon abhalten, wenn nötig einen Beitrag zur Linderung der
humanitären Notlage von Flüchtlingen and Opfern gewaltsamer Konflikte zu leisten.
Entsprechend des Ansatzes positiver Konditionalität und des von der EU formulierten „more
for more“ Prinzips sollte Europas Kooperationsbereitschaft jedoch vor allem den neu begrün-
deten Demokratien in Tunesien und Ägypten sowie den Regierungen gelten, die substanziel-
le Reformen angekündigt haben und diese auch umsetzen. Europa muss seine Hilfe für diese
Länder vor allem als Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe verstehen und anlegen.
Tunesien und Ägypten benötigen Unterstützung für die Konsolidierung ihrer neuen politi-
schen Systeme. Sie brauchen zudem wirtschaftliche Hilfe, da die Revolutionen zu Schwierig-
keiten in wichtigen Bereichen ihre Volkswirtschaften geführt haben, etwa im Tourismussektor.
Reformwillige Regierungen sollte die EU ermutigen und unterstützen, ihre Ankündigungen
entsprechend der Forderungen der Bevölkerung umzusetzen. Insbesondere ein stärkeres
System der Gewaltenteilung, Maßnahmen der Korruptionsbekämpfung und die Achtung der
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Bürgerrechte und der Pressefreiheit sind hier Prioritäten. Die Zeit bloßer kosmetischer
Reformen ist vorbei. 
Für die europäische Politik, die sich in der Vergangenheit auf autoritäre Herrscher als
Garanten eines prekären Status Quo in der Region verlassen hat, bedeutet dies eine erheb-
liche Veränderung. Nach anfänglicher Zurückhaltung sind die Europäer mittlerweile dazu
übergegangen, Aspekte wie gute Regierungsführung, eine Miteinbeziehung der Zivilgesell-
schaft und positive Konditionalität in den Vordergrund ihrer Politik zu stellen. 
Die Forderung der Protestbewegungen geht weit über politische Fragen hinaus und schließt
auch wirtschaftliche und soziale Themen mit ein. Insbesondere der Mangel an Arbeitsplätzen
und das Fehlen einer wirtschaftlichen Perspektive bergen großes Unruhepotenzial und stel-
len ernsthafte Herausforderungen für alle Staaten Nordafrikas dar. Um diesen zu begegnen,
müssen Europa und Nordafrika eine Vision nachhaltiger Entwicklung begründen, die es
ermöglicht, gemeinsame Interessen zu verfolgen und die bestehenden Potenziale für Ar-
beitsplätze und Wohlstand in der Region zu entwickeln.
Einen unmittelbareren Effekt könnte die EU erzielen, wenn sie den nordafrikanischen
Staaten breiteren Zugang für ihre Agrarprodukte zum europäischen Binnenmarkt gewährt.
Eine Stärkung der landwirtschaftlichen Kapazitäten durch effektivere Nutzung von Wasser
und Boden stellt ein weiteres aussichtsreiches Kooperationsfeld dar. Zudem sollten die Euro-
päer zur Diversifikation der nordafrikanischen Volkswirtschaften beitragen, indem sie die
Schaffung einer lokalen Investitionsgüterindustrie unterstützen. 
Die Verbesserung der Mobilität zwischen Nordafrika und Europa sollte ein weiteres Thema
der Zusammenarbeit sein. Insbesondere die Einführung gemeinsam organisierter Program-
me zirkulärer Migration für Studenten, Unternehmer und Facharbeiter erscheint vielver-
sprechend. Derartige Projekte würden einen Beitrag dazu leisten, die demographischen
Herausforderungen nördlich und südlich des Mittelmeers zu meistern und Brücken zwischen
Gesellschaften und Kulturen schaffen. Zudem könnten sie einen nachhaltigen Effekt für die
nordafrikanischen Arbeitsmärkte erzielen, wenn die Migranten nach der Rückkehr in ihre
Heimat dabei unterstützt werden, ihre eigenen Geschäftsideen zu entwickeln.
Eine besonders aussichtsreiche Perspektive bietet sich darüber hinaus im Bereich der erneuer-
baren Energien. Der Mittelmeersolarplan oder die privatwirtschaftliche Desertec Initiative stel-
len konkrete Ansätze für die Zusammenarbeit bei der Gewinnung erneuerbarer Energien dar.
Projekte wie diese können Europäern und Nordafrikanern helfen, ihre Energieversorgung
nachhaltig zu sichern, und würden darüber hinaus dazu beitragen, dringend benötigte
Arbeitsplätze in Nordafrika zu schaffen und Ansätze der regionalen Kooperation zu stärken.
37
Prospects and Challenges for a Revitalized Relationship between Europe and North Africa
Neue Politik
Soziökonomische Forderungen
Marktzugang und Diversifikation
Mobilität
Erneuerbare Energien
1. How do the political developments of the Arab spring impact on the projects of the Desertec
Industrial Initiative?
The developments in North Africa are of a different nature from country to country. It is our
mission to enable the long-term development of renewable energies for the local population
and for export to Europe. No matter how local political processes are developing, the need
for clean energy and perspectives of people will not become less important in any scenario.
On the contrary, until 2050 the population of North Africa is expected to grow strongly, more
than double compared with today’s population. Accordingly, there will not only be a growing
energy demand, but also an urgent need for jobs and economic prospects for the fast grow-
ing young generation. For that reason we are determined to assist governments as much as
possible on these objectives. 
2. What are the lessons learned from the first two years of Dii and what are the next steps to
be taken?
We work along a strategic plan outlining a number of focused activities and studies up to the
end of 2012. Among others we talk with governments in order to define together 2-3 refer-
ence projects that would demonstrate the feasibility of the Desertec idea. Although the core
of our mission is to draft a comprehensive long term "Roll Out Plan up to 2050", we wish to
show already in the coming years that costs can be reduced and that for example export to
the EU is feasible. Dii expects solar based desert power to become profitable without incen-
tives within the next 15 years. Then the market for solar will further develop by itself. Wind
energy is already approaching market competitiveness.
Our first focus is Morocco as the Moroccan grid is already connected with Spain and, hence,
renewable energy could be delivered locally and into the EU markets. We are working together
with the authorities to define a meaningful demonstration project the earliest possible. In
addition Dii is currently conducting a prefeasibility study together with STEG Energie
Renouvelable to examine the required political, regulatory, economic and technical frame-
work for large scale solar and wind projects in Tunisia, including transmission and market
integration. We are also talking to the Egyptian and Algerian governments to shape coopera-
tion upon their wish.
3. The Desertec concept offers a great vision of sustainable co-development and energy secu-
rity for Europe and North Africa. Yet, in particular in Europe there are critics who doubt the
economic and political viability and technical feasibility of Desertec. Where do you see the
challenges to implement this vision and how can they be overcome?
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We believe that the political changes have made the region more sensitive to sustainability
and integrity. We observe an increased will to engage in renewable energies from the desert.
And, in fact, facing the tremendous growth of energy demand in these countries, and the
need for a better energy mix in Europe, there are hardly alternatives to it. The initial costs
are high, but that will only change if these developments will take off. Although 'Desertec'
is, in the first place, about enabling large scale renewable energy in MENA, it is also about
development of new industries, about the creation of jobs and the transfer of knowledge and
know-how. This will definitely contribute to the long-term prosperity. Stability in the area is
highly important for Europe. We believe that Europe will not ignore this. Europe may engage
in a new long term partnership in various areas of sustainable development with MENA
countries. We are convinced that that will contribute in the most effective way to stable poli-
tical relationships.
4. What are the Desertec consortium’s expectations with regard to political support from the
EU, North African and European governments? How can a financial burden and risk sharing be
arranged?
We would need something like a North-South Pact for Europe and North Africa. The situa-
tion in North Africa, our neighbor, will have great implications for Europe. It seems self evi-
dent that a strong energy and industrial partnership with the countries south of the Medi-
terranean will ultimately determine our joint future. An increased energy policy dialogue
and the development of new partnerships on renewable energy sources are a crucial point
for both North Africa and Europe. The EU should expand the Energy Community Treaty
towards its Southern neighbors. More integration and political support as proposed by a
“Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean” should
be another important step.
Desert power is an important element for the expansion of renewable energy sources and
future energy supplies to Europe. Therefore, Desertec has an integral part in the planning
for energy supply in Europe. Europe has set itself ambitious goals: by 2020, at least 20% of
the primary energy is to be provided from renewable sources. Some EU countries have set
themselves even higher targets. The Dii objective is to pave the way for this development
already in the coming 10 years. Thereafter power from the deserts will most likely contribute
a significant percentage of renewable energy to the complete energy mix not only of North
Africa and the Middle East but also of Europe.
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Excerpt from the speech given by Mr Youssef Amrani, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Morocco and incoming Secretary General of the Union
for the Mediterranean, on 17 May, 2011, at the Panel “The Mediterranean Bridge or Gap?
Challenges for the ENP and UfM” of the 13th Kronberg Middle East Talks in Rabat, Morocco.
I would like, at the outset, to express to you my appreciation for the theme chosen for this
panel and also to emphasize its great importance within the current global context, at a mo-
ment when the Mediterranean is going through a crucial period for its future.
The Thematic is quite compelling and is appealing to all of us on different aspects.
First of all, as a Mediterranean convinced of belonging to a space that is rich historically and
culturally diversified, which is above all, a melting pot that is unique to the world located at
the junction of three continents: Europe, Africa and Asia.
This Mediterranean space is equally unique as it constitutes a real epicentre to the contem-
porary strategic challenges that we share.
The events taking place in the Arab countries cannot be dissociated from their global and
regional context. As you know, the world had to face an unprecedented global crisis which
only recently started to show signs of change. North Mediterranean countries are now facing
exceptional financial and budgetary difficulties (such as Portugal, Greece, and Spain), which
generated a trend towards a continued immigration, the scale of which, is growing with
known consequences.
Indeed, the movements that have been initiated in the Arab Countries, since the beginning
of this year, are bearing great hopes for redefining the Arab citizenship, democratic aspira-
tions, economic liberalization and human development.
These regional and global movements, unpredictable as they may be, are appealing to us to
double our efforts to: Give a collective meaning to our policy, first in the field of migration
management by looking for a greater closeness between our respective populations, for a
more equitable distribution of the fruits of growth, in terms of exchange, in addition to goods
and services, to privilege “science” and “knowledge”, which is an important capital that
allows future generations to dispose of the scientific basis necessary to face the threats and
challenges of the future. (…)
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If the Mediterranean is first and foremost a space that combines all these sharing and com-
mon aspirations, it is also the theatre where coexist deep inequalities. These inequalities
exist between countries of the north and the south but also between countries from the
south themselves.
Needless to evoke all the points of differentiation between north and south, I will simply
raise three principal gaps between both shores.
We can first of all, denote the existence of a (1) demographic gap, which poses the problem
of a demographic split between an aging north and a much younger south and generates in
the Mediterranean a perilous demographic situation. The southern populations account on
average approximately 34% of youngesters that are under fifteen of age, the same age group
only makes up 17.3% in the north, the ratio is therefore double in the south.
Another major gap in the Mediterranean is (2) economical. The wealth gap keeps widening
between the northern and southern shores. Some studies highlight the fact that the
north/south split in the Mediterranean is the most outstanding in the world. This econo-
mical cleavage results in the rise of economical tensions and frustrations. Indeed, profound
income disparities affect the Mediterranean where the average GDP per inhabitant is esti-
mated at 13 375$ for the northern states but is only 3 288$ for the south.
By the same token, but this time regarding new information technologies, we note the tech-
nological take off of countries from the north where the number of internet connexions is 5
times greater than in the south. Within a world that is interdependent, the Mediterranean
shows a two-speed development rate, which confirms the existence of (3) a digital and tech-
nological gap.
It is, thus, difficult not to see a growing bipolarisation of the Mediterranean space, on one
side the western basin (or Med-western) and in the eastern basin on the other (or Med-
Oriental).
Therefore, does the Mediterranean truly embody a unified geopolitical space? In the light of
disparities and observed inequalities, are there different Mediterraneans? Or is there a
multi- speed Mediterranean? (…)
In such an unpredictable regional and global context made of uncertainties, splits and weak-
nesses, the Mediterranean appeals to us twice. On the one hand, the density of conflicts in
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this region creates pockets of permanent instability. On the other hand this space witnesses
a multitude of challenges and inequalities that keep growing in this new strategic context.  
For the EU as for the southern partners, the challenge is unique, which is also one of the
objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) adopted, in 1995 in Barcelona: the
creation of a euro-Mediterranean area of shared prosperity and stability cannot be created if
it includes solely the establishment of a free trade zone. The creation of an area of shared
prosperity must necessarily be accompanied by the gradual creation of a euro-Medi-
terranean area that generates equitable growth, support investment and focus on sustain-
able socioeconomic development.
Indeed the framework created by the Barcelona agreements based on the idea of co-member-
ship of the multilateral structure is the most promising of the Mediterranean basin. The ENP
launched in 2004 can be considered one of the best bilateral policies crafted so far by the EU
to countries south of the border.
However, the context of current movements in the Arab countries added to the many chal-
lenges for the whole region in terms of managing migration flows, taking into account key
or vital sectors such as agriculture or tourism, energy deficits and environment issues, high-
light new challenges. (…)
The bilateral Action Plans have been effective for defining priority actions to achieve, parti-
cularly in terms of the legal convergence and supporting economic reforms.  However, lessons
must be learned from the delay in implementation of some key reforms. Besides, the ongoing
debate on the future of the ENP, of which Morocco is a partner, is a strategic exercise of the
uttermost importance. In this context, the trend taken by the advanced status in the concep-
tion of the new instrument may be useful to reflect on the future pillars of the ENP.
In this regard, three areas could be taken into account, the construction of “an area of shared
values” of democracy, good governance and human rights, building a “common economic
space” which will enable the country which engages in it to draw on the “acquis communau-
taire” to build an open economy and solidarity and build “an area of approximation between
people”  that could include the mobility partnership to encourage, better regulation and faci-
litate travel in particular, for teachers, researchers, students and businessmen.
Obviously the financial support aspect should not be avoided since it is fundamental to the
consideration of the principle of “positive conditionality” and to ensure greater efficiency in
42
The Arab World in Transition
the implementation of reforms. Similarly, we should reflect together on the possibilities of
development-oriented cooperation which could be an important framework devoted to
mechanisms inspired by regional development funds, social funds and cohesion funds.
Finally, the future ENP would be more effective if it gives more visibility to partners who
adopt it through a strong political support of the EU, as it did in the 90s with East European
countries.(…)
One of the strengths of the ENP was to identify the differences of each partner as "a custo-
mized formula" that allows each country to move at a pace, more or less, sustained, according
to the principles of “co-decision”, of “positive conditionality”, and “differentiation”. This is
probably the best suited formula to lead the future regional cooperation regarding the UfM.
However, today we cannot help asking ourselves the question, whether to continue pursuing
the current target of the UfM-based management of common issues focused on developmental
projects? Or rather move towards a model of society and development, as is the case for the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)?
An impressive number of studies, seminars and discussions focused on the question of the
fate of the UfM, a sign of great interest of Euro-Mediterranean countries raised by this inter-
governmental organization.
Instead of initiating yet another analysis on the shortcomings of the EMP, it may be time to
seek alternatives and explore the real options that come to Europe and the Mediterranean
Partner Countries (MPCs).
It is essential to overcome the deficits of the past and move on confidently forward on a new
basis, taking into account regional and international new order.
Today, development and socio-economic needs are known. It will now define the priority pro-
jects that could be implemented, adequate funding and sub-regions or countries that bene-
fit from these regional action plans. 
Along these lines, let me share with you some thoughts on the future of the Euro-Mediter-
ranean cooperation, questioning the geographical shape of the project, its objectives and its
instruments, and procedure.
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In the same way as EU questions about its own boundaries, the question of the scope of the
UfM can not be ignored. The geopolitical reality, the diversity of issues and intensity of inter-
actions with the EU makes us think about possible divisions of the Mediterranean in more
homogeneous areas of cooperation. In this sense, the western Mediterranean seems a suit-
able space, having in its favor a relatively successful experience of intergovernmental co-
operation, as is it the case of the “5 +5 Dialogue”. 
The implementation of a dynamic sub-regional cooperation in the western Mediterranean
could be a solution to overcome the current deadlock, through the establishment of closer
cooperation and variable geometry, and the establishment of synergies, especially with the
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which offers a great potential for this project.
To ensure the feasibility of identified projects, it’s essential to ensure effective mechanisms
for financing and managing specific projects and to find how to involve the European
Commission and the institutions that have the required experience and the necessary exper-
tise in managing and functioning regional projects.
The EMP's goal was the creation of a zone of prosperity and shared security around the
Mediterranean, and the promotion of sustainable development, democratization and politi-
cal cooperation between the partners and mutual understanding between peoples.
However, it was observed that some regional programs implemented at the multilateral
level, have been limited to organizing meetings, training and technical assistance and stu-
dies. It is necessary to think about a specific methodology for increasing the operational
capacity of the actions and monitoring.
The future of the UfM is also closely linked to the strategy to be adopted by member coun-
tries. They were asked to choose between a regional construction in economic and technical
fields or a more global perspective that would preserve the achievements of the EMP and
integrate a strategic vision of Euro-Mediterranean relations on the long term.
Moreover, it is important to ensure that the objectives will be retained for future ENP and
converge with those underlying the future path of the UfM. 
This backdrop will allow joint bilateral and regional projects to move forward in the same
direction. With over 100 million youth in the MENA region (North Africa and Middle East),
aged 15-29 years who constitute about a third of the population of these countries. 
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The social inclusion of youth in the external cooperation of the European Union with the
MPC has become an essential field to establish cohesion and better understanding among
future stakeholders on both sides.
Convinced that the fate of the EU is strongly linked to the fate of its neighbors, the EU is 
called more than ever to raise the Mediterranean as a solidarity priority area in the fields of
regional cooperation.
Indeed, the strengthening of ties and the multiplication of bridges between the Euro-
Mediterranean countries is, at the same time, a geographical evidence, an economic neces-
sity, a political responsibility and a strategic need.
Given its particular strategic importance, the EU should seize the opportunity of the ongoing
events occurring in North Africa to strengthen its involvement in the Mediterranean within
crucial fields for the present and the future of the 22 Mediterranean riparian countries and
neighboring states.
If the UfM is not quickly back on track to accompany the changes emerging in the South, it
might miss the historic opportunity to meet the needs of Southern partner countries and
support the necessary multi-sectoral reforms.
(…) To conclude, I want to join again the group of convinced Mediterranean, that we are, and
appeal to all partner countries to give the "Mare Nostrum" the attention it truly deserves as
a legacy from our forefathers. A legacy that comes with great pride but also implies greater
responsibilities.
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Learning from Transformation Processes in Other Regions
By Sabine Donner and Hauke Hartmann, Senior Project Managers, Transformation Index (BTI)
The societal changes in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East have given rise to
hopes that we are witnessing an Arab Spring. On account of its momentous consequences
what is happening can certainly be compared to the democratization processes in Eastern
Europe. 2011 may well turn out to be the most memorable year after 1989, and, if so, will be
associated with the advent of new democratic neighbours on the southern shores of the
Mediterranean. In both cases experts, journalists and politicians were surprised by the
speed and the radical nature of the societal changes. When it came to the Arab world, very
few people reckoned with the fact that a longing for democracy and participation would
unite and mobilize citizens to stand up and oppose their authoritarian rulers. For decades
the foreign policy pursued by Western states lent support to these repressive regimes for
geo-strategic and political reasons. In contrast to religious fundamentalism, which was per-
ceived to be the only alternative, they seemed to be both reliable and stable.
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) analyses and evaluates the progress
that is being made in 128 developing and transformation countries as they move to demo-
cracy under the rule of law, and a market economy flanked by socio-political safeguards, as
well as the quality of governance. It has defined a normative reference framework which in
principle states that regions and civilizations throughout the world share a striving for free-
dom, political and economic participation, prosperity and just income distribution. The
upheaval in the Arab world confirms the basic validity of this research premise. The demo-
cracy agenda of the demonstrators in Tunis and Cairo, and subsequently in Manama and
Damascus, has emphasized in an impressive manner that in the Arab world there are
various political alternatives to repressive governments and fundamentalist theocracies.
Thus, the support given to supposedly stable autocratic regimes not only undermines the
credibility of the West as a champion of democracy and human rights. More than anything
else it fails to do justice to the hopes and aspirations of people who live in developing and
transformation countries. The ostensible dualism of security policy realism and pro-demo-
cracy idealism should give way to the view that good governance and long-term stability can-
not be attained without comprehensive political and economic participation. And they can-
not be attained without democracy under the rule of law, and a market economy anchored
in principles of social justice. This was true of Eastern Europe just over twenty years ago,
and is now true of North Africa and the Middle East.
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VII. Democratization in the Arab World
The Arab World in Transition
Learning from Transformation and the Experiences of Others
The political changes in the Arab world in many ways seem comparable to the democratiza-
tion processes in Eastern Europe. It is thus tempting to draw conclusions from these ex-
periences at a time where the EU’s southern neighbours are facing undoubtedly difficult and
presumably protracted transformation processes. In fact the Arab reformist movements al-
ready demonstrated an impressive resourcefulness and an ability to learn in this area. They
have carefully studied the experiences of others who have organized civil society resistance
against autocrats—for example, those of the Serbian organization Otpor!, which later commu-
nicated its insights to other groups—and have used them successfully for their own pur-
poses. Other experiences from Eastern Europe may turn out to be helpful in what one hopes
is the imminent consolidation phase of the new democracies in North Africa. There is, for
example, the necessity to translate democratic gains into legal safeguards at an early stage.
There is the long-term advantage of consulting civil society organizations on an ongoing
basis instead of relying on informal agreements among the elite. And there is the judicious
selection of election dates in order to deal with the problem of ethnic cleavages. However, we
are not talking about the provision of blueprints, since in certain crucial areas the situation
in the Arab world does not resemble the circumstances surrounding the transformation pro-
cesses in Eastern Europe. Yet one can also learn something from the differences.
First, the eastern European countries had to grapple with a dual transformation process. In
addition to democratization they were faced with the transition from a planned economy to
a market economy. The euphoric reports issued by the World Bank and the World Economic
Forum show this is not necessary in many Arab countries. In contrast to these accounts,
which have recently lavished a great deal of praise on the economic development of coun-
tries such as Egypt or Tunisia, the BTI country reports, which are more sceptical in this
regard, believe that it is important to take into account the cost of liberalization (e.g. youth
unemployment, disparities between urban and rural areas, greater social inequality). This is
an issue that these countries have still not managed to resolve. The BTI suggests that mar-
ket economies ought to be “flanked by socio-political safeguards.” This is something that
needs to be given greater emphasis in the Arab world, and thus, in addition to the reduction
of nepotism and corruption, the focus must be on the establishment and enlargement of a
sustainable and inclusive social order. In the transformation processes in Eastern Europe
this happened rather late in the day, so that populism and idealized views of the past were
sometimes able to dominate the political discourse. Today’s Arab reformers should think
about this restorationist and populist phase in Eastern Europe and should not neglect the
social and welfare aspect of economic change.
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Secondly, when it came to the educational level of their inhabitants and their administrative
structures, the countries of the former Eastern bloc were initially in a far better position. A
central problem in many Arab countries that the Transformation Index has identified on a
number of occasions is the alarmingly low educational level and the attendant lack of skilled
workers. On top of this the administrative apparatus is frequently inefficient and corrupt,
and is at variance with the notion of a stable transformation process. The preconditions for
the creation of structures based on the rule of law were far better in Eastern Europe than
they are in the Arab world. Much basic work remains to be done before moving on to the pro-
vision of advice on the establishment of a democratic and responsive administration as it
happened within the framework of the twinning projects that linked Western and Eastern
Europe. In this area Eastern Europe teaches us that it is important to redouble our efforts in
the educational sector.
Thirdly, the Arab countries lack the kind of external stabilization that was provided by the
prospect of EU membership in the case of numerous states in East-Central and South-eastern
Europe. When it comes to market access, easier trade conditions and economic cooperation,
the EU will have to think more precisely about how in fact all this can be designed and
implemented so that it is useful for all concerned and has a stabilizing effect.
Finally, the experiences gained in East-Central and South-eastern Europe provide us with a
rich array of examples of good governance and strategic policymaking. For example, it is
worth thinking about Macedonia, which on account of its ethnic diversity concluded a series
of innovative agreements in the 2001 Ohrid Accords in order to ensure the appropriate par-
ticipation of the Albanian minority in policymaking and the government. In addition to
administrative decentralization and the equal status accorded to the Albanian language, this
has come about primarily through the introduction of dual majority voting, which means
that in addition to an overall parliamentary majority, parliamentary decisions also require a ma-
jority within the parliamentary group of the ethnic Albanian minority in order to be adopted.
For Arab countries with a heterogeneous population structure (e.g. religious conflicts in
Bahrain or rival tribes in Libya) this constitutes an example of how democratization and inte-
gration can be combined.
But in order to learn from successful transformation processes one should not only study
European examples. In order to make it possible to compare different world regions, the BTI,
which is the only index in the world that offers qualitative analyses of government achieve-
ments based on evaluations by experts, compiles detailed reports on 128 developing and
transformation states. We believe that the following examples of good governance are espe-
cially noteworthy:
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The first obvious example is provided by Islamic countries where a political system that used
to be dominated by the armed forces has been placed under civilian control, and which have
also succeeded in preventing religiously motivated extremists from playing the kind of pro-
minent role that might have enabled them to undermine the transformation process. 
One such success story, if one disregards a lengthy and fragile transitional period, is
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. Much can be learnt from studying in
detail the transition to a civilian government after the end of the Suharto dictatorship. It was
masterminded by Jusuf Habibie, who was himself a close confidant of Suharto. Furthermore,
in many Arab countries Turkey is nowadays considered to be a model example of how poli-
cies based on Islam, political moderation and regional credibility can be coupled with an
increasing inability on the part of the armed forces to veto domestic policy decisions. Since
the first publication of the BTI in early 2004, Turkey has continuously improved its position
in the democracy as well as the market economy ranking.
Another example is the strategically prudent and sustainable approach to their natural
resources which has been embraced for many years by the governments of Botswana and
Chile. Since independence Botswana has used the wealth that it obtains primarily from dia-
mond mining to finance the goals set forth in its National Development Plans, which apply
in particular to the areas of education and health. Chile is using the growing revenues from
its copper mining sector to increase the size of its stabilization fund and foreign currency
reserves, and recently, in response to the global economic and financial crisis, was able to
use these reserves in order to finance many of its anti-cyclical stimulus programmes.
Resource-rich Arab countries may want to model their policymaking on the strategic and
efficient approach to natural resources seen in other developing and emerging countries.
The resource-rich Gulf states, especially Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, are
investing much of their revenues into the educational sector. They have understood that
natural resources are finite and that in the long run dependency on oil will have to be re-
duced. Thus it is imperative to expand the services sector, and this calls for a certain level
of education. This is something the resource-rich countries of North Africa may want to
study in greater detail.
Finally, it is possible to learn from Brazil how to incorporate social and civil society groups
into political decision-making processes in a meaningful manner so that it amounts to more
than mere lip service. In its policymaking the government of President Lula made a deter-
mined effort to include civil society organizations from all areas—unions, women’s organiza-
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tions, the landless movement, environmental groups, consumer protection organizations
and entrepreneurs’ associations. An example of this is the “Economic and Social
Development Council,” which was set up by President Lula in order to initiate a social dia-
logue about the future of the country and the forthcoming challenges.  The council is made
up of ordinary citizens and civil society representatives. Its “National Development Agenda”
is a pact for sustainable growth coupled with social inclusion, employment and just income
distribution. Its findings have become a part of the presidential decision-making processes,
and it continues to monitor the progress that is being made. It is not surprising that the
Participatory Budgeting scheme of the Brazilian city of Recife, the recipient of this year’s
Reinhard Mohn Prize, which is awarded by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, comes from this coun-
try with its high participatory culture. In view of recent events in North Africa, which high-
lighted the mobilization speed and assertiveness of civil society groups, the governments in
this part of the world would do well to study the Brazilian example.
This handful of examples shows that even a cursory glance at the numerous transformation
processes throughout the world can help one to understand the strengths and successes of
other countries and governments. The Bertelsmann Stiftung´s Transformation Index pro-
vides us with an important tool in this regard.
About the Transformation Index (BTI)
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index analyses and evaluates the state of demo-
cracy, the market economy and political management in 128 developing and transformation
countries. It measures both successes and setbacks on the path leading to democracy under
the rule of law and a market economy flanked by socio-political safeguards. Detailed coun-
try reports form the basis for the evaluation of the state of development, the problems and
the ability of the political actors to implement reforms in a resolute and goal-oriented manner.
Thus the BTI is the first international comparative index which measures the quality of
governance with data that it has gathered itself, and provides a comprehensive analysis of
political management performance in transformation processes worldwide.
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Table 2: Human Development Index
HDI Value
2007/2008
HDI Value
2010
HDI rank
2007/2008 (a)
HDI rank
2010 (b)
Algeria 0.733 0.677 104 84
Egypt 0.708 0.620 112 101
Libya 0.818 0.755 56 53
Morocco 0.646 0.567 126 114
Tunisia 0.766 0.683 91 81
(a) of 177; (b) of 169
Source: UNDP: Human Development Report 2010 & 2007/2008
Table 1: Bertelsmann Transformation Index
Status Index
2006 (a)
Status Index
2010 (a)
Management
Index 2006 (a)
Management
Index 2010 (a)
Algeria 4.42 4.86 3.63 3.92
Egypt 4.29 4.82 3.88 4.30
Libya 4.00 4.49 3.14 3.05
Morocco 4.62 4.47 4.77 4.02
Tunisia 5.17 4.98 4.42 4.30
(a) scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest);
Sources: Bertelsmann Stiftung: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010 & 2006
Table 3: Corruption Perception and Press Freedom
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) World Press Freedom Index
2004 CPI
Score (a)
2007 CPI
Score (a)
2008 CPI
Score (a) 
2009 Score (b)
/ Rank of 175 
2010 Score (b)
/ Rank of 178
Algeria 2.7 3.0 3.2 49.56 / 141 47.33 / 133
Egypt 3.2 2.9 2.8 51.38 / 143 43.33 / 127
Libya 2.5 2.5 2.6 64.50 / 156 63.50 / 160
Morocco 3.2 3.5 3.5 41.00 / 127 47.40 / 135
Tunisia 5.0 4.2 4.4 61.50 / 154 72.50 / 164
(a) Scores range from 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)
(b) Lower score indicates more freedom
Sources: Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2009 & 2008
Reporters without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2010 & 2009
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Europe und North Africa: Towards a New Culture of Dialogue
After decades of authoritarian rule, citizens in the Arab world are demanding political, social
and economic participation, accountable leadership and democratic institutions under the rule
of law. Europe must be swift in providing more effective support for the democratization proces-
ses underway. Indeed, the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt signify a turning point
requiring the EU to build new bridges with its North African neighbors.
Unfortunately, debates on how to go about this have so far been held exclusively among Euro-
peans and without those directly affected by the course of events. To expand the circle of debate,
the Bertelsmann Stiftung has invited nine renowned Arab activists and intellectuals from each
North African country to outline a new EU policy capable of achieving the necessary objectives
at hand.
Their essays, ideas and suggestions are now available in the publication, “The Future of the
Mediterrannean. Which Way for Europe and North Africa,” which has been published as part of
the Europe in Dialogue series. In order to foster dialogue across cultures, the publication is ap-
pearing simultaneously in English and Arabic.
The publication is available online in English at
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/EuropeInDialogueMediterraneanEng
and in Arabic at
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/EuropeInDialogueMediterraneanArab
The authors emphasize that this new relationship must be based on a shared commitment to
democratic values and the rule of law. The relationship between the EU and those states clear-
ly headed toward democracy must be a close partnership of equals. States moving toward reform
must be provided the appropriate support as they are encouraged to take the necessary steps
forward.
Emphasizing the need for the EU to assume a more visible and active stance in support of demo-
cratization, the North African authors call upon the EU to demonstrate greater moral support
and resolve in the pursuit of goals rather than increased funding. This entails providing active
support in preparing elections and building democratic institutions while fostering relations
with all relevant sectors of society. Civil society organizations, for example, should be provided
the necessary tools and means to act as critical monitors of government activity capable of
demanding accountability. The authors also suggest the EU support education efforts across
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North Africa through various initiatives. Finally, economic relations must be fundamentally
rethought. European businesses must be encouraged to establish joint ventures or invest in the
region’s young democracies. The EU could also expand the scope of economic opportunity by
opening its agricultural markets and fostering closer partnerships with North African countries
on issues like solar energy.
These new relations must be built on a culture of open, eye-to-eye dialogue between Europe and
North Africa. This publication is intended as a contribution to this dialogue.
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